

























Can price discrimination lead to product differentiation?
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Abstract
In this paper, I compare two-part tariﬀ competition to linear pricing in a
vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly. Consumers have identical tastes for quality
but diﬀer in their preferences for quantity. The main ﬁnding is that quality
diﬀerentiation occurs in equilibrium if and only if two-part tariﬀs are per-
mitted. Furthermore, two-part tariﬀ competition encourages entry, which in
turn increases welfare. Nevertheless, two-part tariﬀ competition decreases
consumers’ surplus compared to linear pricing.
JEL classiﬁcation: D43, L11, L13
Keywords: Duopoly, Two-part tariﬀ, Vertical diﬀerentiation
1 Introduction
Price discrimination can be observed in many markets, for example in telecommu-
nication markets or electricity services. It is also widely used by airlines, movie
theaters, and various clubs (health, golf etc.).1 In particular two-part tariﬀs are
often observed. Typically contracts in the telecommunication market or in the mar-
ket for electricity contain a ﬁxed fee payment and a per unit charge. Two-part
∗Tel.: +49 228 73 94 73, E-mail address: fabian.herweg@uni-bonn.de.
1For more examples of markets where price discrimination is used see Wilson (1992) or Tirole
(1988, ch.3).
1tariﬀs are also widely practiced in vertical contracts. Manufacturers often charge of
their retailers a franchise or permission fee. In the literature on nonlinear pricing in
oligopolies with complete information, ﬁrms are typically assumed to be horizontally
diﬀerentiated.2 In contrast, I develop a model of two-part tariﬀ competition in a
vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly. Thus, consumers have the same ordinal ranking
for the goods. Consequently, when all ﬁrms use the same tariﬀ, only the commonly
preferred ﬁrm has a positive market share. Quality can be seen as a“vertical”prod-
uct feature in the sense that each consumer prefers higher quality. One example for
quality diﬀerentiation and nonlinear pricing are health clubs: these clubs often levy
a membership fee plus a per use charge and they oﬀer a ﬁxed quality (equipment
and service).3 In many cities there is more than one health club in the city center
(no spatial diﬀerentiation), and in most cases these clubs diﬀer in quality.
The idea that ﬁrms can relax price competition via vertical product diﬀerenti-
ation is due to Shaked and Sutton (1982). I extend the well-known Shaked and
Sutton unit-demand model, or rather the Choi and Chin (1992) version with quasi-
linear utility functions, to multi-unit demands. The analysis presented in this paper
is based on a non-cooperative three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the two potential
duopolists decide whether to enter the market. After observing the entry decisions,
each ﬁrm in the market chooses a quality level for its product. Finally, observing
entry and quality decisions, ﬁrms select a two-part tariﬀ (or a linear price schedule).
At each stage, ﬁrms act simultaneously and independently.
In the presented model consumers diﬀer only in their preferences for quantity.
The main ﬁnding of this paper is that product diﬀerentiation occurs in equilibrium
if and only if price discrimination is permitted. This implies that with linear pric-
ing quality diﬀerentiation does not relax price competition. Since consumers have
identical tastes for quality, ﬁrms’ incentives for quality diﬀerentiation are based on
heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences for quantity. This is a new contribution to
the theory of product diﬀerentiation. By contrast, in earlier work on vertical dif-
ferentiation, consumers are heterogeneous with regard to their (induced) tastes for
quality. In these unit-demand models with linear pricing there are always diﬀeren-
tiated products in the market.4 What is the intuition behind the observation that
only quality diﬀerentiation in combination with two-part tariﬀs can relax compe-
tition? Consumers are homogeneous with respect to their preferences for quality.
Thus, consumers have common preferences for price quality pairs. Consequently,
when ﬁrms are restricted to use linear pricing at most one ﬁrm makes positive prof-
its. On the other hand, ﬁrms cannot exploit consumers’ heterogeneity to relax price
2The subdivision in vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation is due to Lancaster (1979).
3Linear pricing means that the tariﬀ is a linear function of the quantity q, hence a linear tariﬀ
has the following form: T(q) = p · q. Note, a two-part tariﬀ T(q) = A + p · q is an aﬃne function.
4More precisely, ﬁrms choose diﬀerentiated products provided that consumers are suﬃciently
heterogeneous.
2competition via tariﬀ diﬀerentiation on its own: one ﬁrm serves the high demand
consumers by oﬀering a tariﬀ with a high ﬁxed fee and a low marginal price while
the other ﬁrm chooses a tariﬀ with a low ﬁxed fee and a high marginal price to serve
the low demand consumers. This is not a Nash equilibrium of the tariﬀ game for
equal qualities (perfect substitutes). The reasoning is similar to the one behind the
well-known Bertrand paradox: at least one ﬁrm has an incentive to slightly undercut
its rival’s tariﬀ. But, when ﬁrms can choose qualities at a stage before the tariﬀ
competition stage, this quality game is like a commitment device to share the mar-
ket. The high quality ﬁrm serves the high demand consumers and the low quality
ﬁrm serves the low demand consumers. If the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated
and thus competition is softened then market sharing via tariﬀ diﬀerentiation is
incentive compatible.
Moreover, the implications of price discrimination policies on welfare, consumers’
surplus, and industry proﬁts are investigated. I show that welfare and industry
proﬁts are higher and consumers’ surplus is lower if two-part tariﬀs are feasible. If
two-part tariﬀ competition is permitted the ﬁrms can relax competition and thus
both ﬁrms enter the market. The increase in entry supports welfare.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst with vertically diﬀerentiated
ﬁrms and multi-unit demand. Because of the asymmetric structure of vertical diﬀer-
entiation models, the models in the literature are solved for speciﬁc utility functions
only. Since former research is primarily concerned on unit-demand models, there
has been no need to design a tractable utility function for the multi-unit demand
framework. One contribution of this paper is to provide a tractable formulation. The
assumed utility function can be interpreted not only as a consumer’s utility function
but also as the proﬁt function of a retailing ﬁrm. Nonlinear contracts are widely used
and discussed in the context of vertical relations. I present two applications where
the retailer is i) a local monopolist, ii) a price taker. This paper also contributes
to the theory of vertical restraints. The model of the paper can be interpreted as
a model of vertical relations where two manufacturers compete for retailing ﬁrms.
The eﬀect of banning vertical restraints (franchise fees) on upstream competition is
analyzed. The ﬁnding is that banning franchise fees reduces upstream competition.
The structure of the paper is as follows: After a brief review of the related
literature, Section 2 describes the framework of the model. In Section 3, the model
is solved by backwards induction. Section 4 compares the results of two-part tariﬀ
competition and linear pricing. The ﬁnal section summarizes the main ﬁndings and
concludes.
Related Literature: Price discrimination is often observed in oligopolistic mar-
kets. With several notable exceptions, the existing literature on price discrimination
focuses on the monopoly problem (cf. Wilson (1992) for monopoly pricing). The
3following articles analyze competitive third-degree price discrimination.5 Holmes
(1989) studies a duopoly model with diﬀerentiated goods in which both ﬁrms oper-
ate in two distinct markets. The remarkable result of his analysis is that proﬁts can
decrease when price discrimination across markets is permitted. Corts (1998) ob-
tains a similar ﬁnding for an oligopoly model with vertical diﬀerentiation. Borenstein
(1985) studies a free-entry circular-city model where ﬁrms’ possibility to discrimi-
nate is based either on the strength of brand preferences or consumers’ reservation
utilities. Liu and Serfes (2005) analyze a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly where
ﬁrms can purchase information about consumers’ preferences. They ﬁnd that only
the high-quality ﬁrm acquires the information and uses a discriminating tariﬀ. In
contrast to these articles, I analyze second-degree price discrimination.
There exist only few papers on second-degree price discrimination or nonlinear
pricing in oligopoly. A classic paper on this topic is Katz (1984). Katz analyzes
an economy with informed high demand consumers and uninformed low demand
consumers. Informed consumers purchase from the cheapest store while uninformed
consumers choose a store at random. In equilibrium, the ﬁrms choose tariﬀs to
separate these two groups. A seminal contribution to the literature on nonlinear
pricing in oligopoly is Armstrong and Vickers (2001), who study a general framework
with spatially diﬀerentiated ﬁrms that compete in nonlinear tariﬀs.6 They show that
under certain conditions ﬁrms choose welfare optimal two-part tariﬀs in equilibrium.
Nonlinear pricing in spatial competition models is also analyzed by Stole (1995) and
Rochet and Stole (2002).7 The approaches of Stole and Rochet and Stole are highly
related to Armstrong and Vickers if the quality is interpreted as quantity. In these
models consumers have unit-demand and ﬁrms discriminate via diﬀerent quality-
levels. Since quality and quantity have similar properties, these approaches can be
reinterpreted as nonlinear pricing. A logit demand model with two-part tariﬀs is
analyzed by Yin (2004).
In contrast to the articles mentioned so far, I analyze nonlinear pricing in a
model of vertical rather than horizontal diﬀerentiation.8 In a classic contribution on
vertical diﬀerentiation, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) analyze a price equilibrium
of an oligopoly game. Consumers diﬀer in income m and obtain utility U = s ·
(m − p) when they buy quality s at price p. The qualities of the ﬁrms are ﬁxed
exogenously in this model. Shaked and Sutton (1982) extend the Gabszewicz-Thisse
5Pigou (1920) considers three kinds of price discrimination: ﬁrst-degree price discrimination is
perfect price discrimination, second degree price discrimination is discrimination across quantities
and for third degree price discrimination the prices diﬀer for distinguishable consumers.
6Armstrong and Vickers (2001) also analyze third-degree price discrimination.
7A similar framework is studied by Desai (2001) but with a diﬀerent focus.
8There is no commonly accepted deﬁnition of nonlinear pricing. Following Wilson (1992 p.5),
I denote a tariﬀ as nonlinear if the average charge is a function of the purchased quantity. In
unit-demand models where ﬁrms oﬀer various pairs of quality and price, however, these oﬀers are
often denoted as nonlinear pricing function. Based on the second deﬁnition, nonlinear pricing in
a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly is also analyzed by Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Johnson
and Myatt (2003).
4model by endogenizing quality levels. The main result is that in equilibrium ﬁrms
produce distinct qualities and thereby relax price competition. Tirole (1988) shows
robustness of these earlier results for the case of the Mussa-Rosen utility function,
i.e. for the case in which U = θ · s − p, where θ denotes the consumer’s type.9
While Tirole focuses on parameter values such that the market is fully covered
in equilibrium, Choi and Shin (1992) analyze the model when the market is not
covered. A complete characterization of quality choices in a duopoly model in which
consumers have a Mussa-Rosen utility function is given by Wauthy (1996). All these
models assume that consumers have unit-demand. In contrast, I analyze the eﬀects
of quantity discounts in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly, which cannot be captured
by one of the utility functions mentioned above. Consequently, I introduce a novel
tractable utility function for the framework with vertically diﬀerentiated ﬁrms and
multi-unit demand.
2 Description of the model
There are two potential ﬁrms (i = 1,2) producing (distinct) substitute goods. The
two ﬁrms play a non-cooperative three-stage game.10 At the ﬁrst stage, they decide
independently and simultaneously whether or not to enter the market. In case of
entry, a ﬁrm incurs ﬁxed cost K > 0. At stage two, each ﬁrm observes whether
its rival has entered the market. Thereafter, both ﬁrms independently and simul-
taneously choose their respective quality level si ∈ {0, 1
3, 2
3,1}.11 This stage will be
referred to as the quality game. At the third stage, both ﬁrms independently and
simultaneously choose a tariﬀ, having observed the rival’s quality level. Each ﬁrm i
chooses a two-part tariﬀ: Ti(q) = Ai + pi · q.12 Here, q denotes quantity, pi ≥ 0 is
the price per unit, and Ai ≥ 0 a ﬁxed fee. The third stage will be called tariﬀ game.
If price discrimination is banned or infeasible, then Ai = 0. The focus of this paper
is on ﬁrms’ strategic incentives for product diﬀerentiation. To separate this eﬀect, I
assume that costs are zero for all quality levels.
There exists a continuum of consumers with measure one. I assume that con-
sumers practice “one-stop shopping”. That is, consumers make all their purchases
from one ﬁrm. Thus, each consumer takes one of the following three actions: pur-
chase from ﬁrm 1, purchase from ﬁrm 2, or do not purchase at all. Consumers diﬀer
in a taste parameter θ that is uniformly distributed on the unit-interval. I assume
a simple linear demand function. When a consumer of type θ buys from ﬁrm i, his
9Mussa and Rosen (1978) characterize the optimal price-quality schedule for a monopolist.
10This three stage game is similar to the one considered by Shaked and Sutton (1982) for their
unit-demand approach.
11The presented analysis can be generalized to quality-levels si ∈ [0,1]. The existence of tariﬀ
game equilibria, however, then is intricate to show.
12It is assumed that general nonlinear tariﬀs are infeasible.
5demand is given by:
qi(pi,θ) =
(
θ(si − pi) , for pi ≤ si
0 , for pi > si
. (1)
It is assumed that consumers have quasi-linear utility functions and the reservation
utility is normalized to zero. Let vi(pi,θ) be the surplus function of a consumer
of type θ. By Roy’s identity, qi(pi,θ) ≡ −
∂vi(pi,θ)
∂pi . Thus, the surplus function




2θ(si − pi)2 , for pi ≤ si
0 , for pi > si
. (2)
The surplus is the maximum net utility a consumer of type θ can receive excluding
a potential ﬁxed fee payment.13 The type parameter θ is a simple multiplier in
the consumer’s surplus function. Consumer i’s surplus is increasing in the quality
he consumes and decreasing in the marginal price he has to pay. The consumer’s
surplus is a weighted quadratic function of the product’s“net value”. If ﬁrms practice
marginal cost pricing (pi = 0), then the utility of a consumer with type θ is given
by U = 1
2θ · s2
i − Ai.14
Furthermore, it is assumed that consumers have full information about the tariﬀs
and the quality levels in the market. Consumers’ tastes are private information, only
the distribution is known by the ﬁrms. If a consumer is indiﬀerent between ﬁrm 1
and ﬁrm 2, he purchases the higher-quality product. If quality levels are equal, the
consumer chooses a store at random.15
The equilibrium concept employed is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Thus, the game is solved by backwards induction.
In the next section I discuss two applications of the model described so far to
vertical relations. Readers not interested in this topic may skip the next section.
2.1 Applications to vertical relations
The above surplus function can also be interpreted as a proﬁt function of a retailer.
Two-part tariﬀs are widely used and discussed in the context of vertical relations.16
Assume that ﬁrms, called manufacturers in this section, do not sell their products
13Let the utility of consuming the good under consideration with quality si be u(q,si,θ). Then
vi(pi,θ) ≡ maxq {u(q,si,θ) − piq}. It is assumed that the utility maximization problem has an
interior solution. A utility function corresponding to the assumed surplus function is discussed in
Section 4.
14In this case the consumer’s utility function is similar to the well known Mussa and Rosen
(1978) utility function for unit demand models with distinct qualities, where U = θ · s − p. The
Mussa and Rosen utility function is used in various models of vertically diﬀerentiated markets, for
instance Choi and Shin (1992), or in an augmented version in Rochet and Stole (2002).
15This assumption is not crucial, however, it simpliﬁes some proofs.
16Classic contributions to the theory of vertical restraints, in particular on upstream competition
and two-part tariﬀs, are Rey and Stiglitz (1988) and Bonnano and Vickers (1988).
6to consumers directly but to a retail ﬁrm. A retail ﬁrm can only sell the product of
a single manufacturer. As far as vertical relations are concerned, when the manufac-
turer sets a ﬁxed fee, this ﬁxed fee can be interpreted as franchise fee. For instance,
the decision of a potential retailer may be to open either a McDonald’s, a Pizza Hut,
or neither. A model of vertical diﬀerentiation and market power on the upstream
market is also analyzed in Avenel and Caprice (2006). In their model a monopolist
produces a high quality product and the low quality product is produced by a com-
petitive fringe. Product diﬀerentiation on the upstream market is exogenous. The
focus of Avenel and Caprice is on retailers’ product lines. In the reinterpretation of
the model introduced so far, both upstream ﬁrms have market power and the degree
of quality diﬀerentiation is endogenous. But the retailers are exclusive dealers, who
cannot sell the products of both manufacturers.
In the following, I will give two examples of how the surplus function (2) can be
interpreted as a proﬁt function of a retailer who sells manufacturer i’s products.
Example 1: Retailer is local monopolist Consider a retailer of type θ ∈
(0,1] who sells the products of manufacturer i. Assume that the retailer is a local
monopolist and operates without costs. The inverse demand function he faces is






Here, θ measures the “market size” in the downstream market. A higher θ corre-
sponds to a retailer with higher demand. Given a tariﬀ Ti oﬀered by manufacturer i












q − piq − Ai . (3)
The retailer maximizes his proﬁt with respect to the quantity he sells to consumers
(which equals the quantity he purchases from manufacturer i). From the ﬁrst-order




i(pi,θ) = θ(si − pi) . (4)








2 − Ai . (5)
Hence, ignoring the ﬁxed fee, the retailer’s proﬁt function is equivalent to the surplus
function (2).
7Example 2: Retailer is price taker Consider a retail ﬁrm that operates as
a price taker. Suppose there exists a competitive fringe selling the same qualities
as produced by the manufacturers. The market price depends on the quality the
retailer sells and is given by
P(si) = si . (6)







where θ measures how eﬃcient the retailer is. If θ is high, the retailer has relatively
low costs for serving consumers. The proﬁt of the retailer when selling the products
of ﬁrm i is then given by
π
PT





− piq − Ai , (8)
where Ai is a franchise fee the retailer has to pay for the permission to sell ﬁrm i’s
products. Maximizing πPT
R (q,i,θ) with respect to q allows to obtain the following
supply function of a retailer with cost parameter θ:
q
∗
i(q,θ) = θ(si − pi) . (9)








2 − Ai . (10)
Again, the indirect proﬁt function is equivalent to the surplus function (2) minus
the ﬁxed fee.
In what follows, I focus on the case where each producer (i = 1,2) oﬀers his
products to consumers directly. Nevertheless, the above applications allow one to
interpret consumers as retail outlets. The implications of the model for the context
of vertical relations are discussed in the conclusions.
2.2 Preliminary remarks on the quality game
In this section, I establish that when both ﬁrms are active in the market, they
produce distinct quality levels.
Lemma 1 Suppose that both ﬁrms produce the same quality and two-part tariﬀs
are feasible, then in the unique tariﬀ game equilibrium both ﬁrms use the cost-based
linear tariﬀ T ∗ = 0 · q and earn zero proﬁts.
8Proof: All proofs are given in the appendix.
The intuition is similar to the reasoning behind the well-known Bertrand paradox.
Assume, for a sake of contradiction, that both ﬁrms produce the same quality and at
least one ﬁrm makes positive proﬁts. Then the ﬁrm with lower proﬁts can increase
its proﬁts by slightly undercutting the rival’s tariﬀ.17 Firm i undercutting ﬁrm j’s
tariﬀ means that in an expenditure-quantity diagram the tariﬀ of ﬁrm i is completely
below the tariﬀ of ﬁrm j. This logic is still true when the ﬁrms have equal positive
proﬁts. When ﬁrm i slightly undercuts ﬁrm j’s tariﬀ, ﬁrm i obtains all customers of
ﬁrm j and almost always keeps some of its former customers. Consequently, slightly
undercutting the rival’s tariﬀ increases proﬁts. Hence, for equal qualities I obtain
that the well-known Bertrand result also holds when two-part tariﬀs are feasible.
Without quality diﬀerentiation there is perfect competition and price discrimi-
nation is infeasible. Therefore, I obtain the following result for the subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In any subgame perfect equilibrium in which both ﬁrms enter, the
ﬁrms produce distinct quality levels.
This result extends Proposition 1 in Shaked and Sutton (1982) to the multi-unit
approach with two-part tariﬀs.
3 Formal analysis
3.1 The tariﬀ game
Suppose that s2 > s1, so that there is a high-quality supplier (ﬁrm 2) and a low-
quality supplier (ﬁrm 1). The net surplus of a consumer of type θ, given the tariﬀs






2θ(s2 − p2)2 − A2, if he buys from ﬁrm 2 (high-quality)
1
2θ(s1 − p1)2 − A1, if he buys from ﬁrm 1 (low-quality)
0 , otherwise
. (11)
In equilibrium, consumers with relatively strong tastes for the product buy from
the high-quality ﬁrm. For “middle-type” consumers, the high-quality ﬁrm is too
expensive, hence they purchase the low-quality product at a (very) cheap tariﬀ.
Consumers with relatively low tastes do not purchase at all. I will call consumers
who are indiﬀerent between two options “marginal consumers”. Therefore, in the
economy there exist two kinds of marginal consumers: one is indiﬀerent between
buying from ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, whereas the other marginal consumer is indiﬀerent




Figure 1: Optimal choices for diﬀerent consumer types
marginal consumer will be denoted by ˜ θ, the latter type by ˆ θ.
The assumed market structure implies that A2 > A1 and (s2 − p2) > (s1 − p1)
in equilibrium.18 From the deﬁnitions of the marginal consumers, one immediately






















2 − (s1 − p1)
2
+ A1 (14)
Note that given pi and the rival’s tariﬀ, the ﬁxed fee Ai is uniquely determined by
˜ θ. Put diﬀerently, the choice of the ﬁxed fee is equivalent to choosing the marginal
consumer ˜ θ .19 Each ﬁrm i chooses (pi, ˜ θ) to maximize proﬁts. The ﬁrms’ proﬁt
functions, for a given tariﬀ of the competitor, are20




π1(p1, ˜ θ) =

˜ θ − ˆ θ(˜ θ,p1)





17The tariﬀ Ti undercuts tariﬀ Tj if ∀q piq + Ai < pjq + Aj.
18Ex ante, there may exist an equilibrium where A2 < A1 and (s2 − p2) < (s1 − p1), such that
the consumers with high tastes purchase the low quality. Fortunately, this case can be ruled out as
an equilibrium candidate for the relevant quality levels. The appendix gives a formal proof of this
claim, however, readers should be aware that the claim requires some results presented in Section
3 later on.
19Note that in equilibrium the marginal consumers ˜ θ chosen by the two ﬁrms are the same.
20More precisely, Ai = Ai(pi,pj,Aj, ˜ θ) for i 6= j, but I suppress in the following the rival’s tariﬀ
parameters.
10For now, assume that ﬁrms’ maximization problems have interior solutions. In the
appendix it is shown that this is indeed the case.
3.1.1 Proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm 2 (high-quality supplier)
More speciﬁcally, the proﬁt function of the high quality ﬁrm is given by
π2(p2, ˜ θ) = (1 − ˜ θ) · A2 +
1
2









2 − (s1 − p1)
2
+ A1 .
First, setting the partial derivative of π2 with respect to p2 equal to zero allows to






(1 − ˜ θ)s2 . (18)
Hence, p∗
2 depends only indirectly on rival’s tariﬀ via ˜ θ. The optimal marginal price
p∗
2 is determined by the marginal consumer ˜ θ. A greater market share of ﬁrm 2
leads to a higher marginal price. A greater market share is accompanied by a lower
ﬁxed fee. Thus, less of the surplus of the served consumers can be extracted by the
ﬁxed fee. This leads to a raise in the optimal marginal price. Note that the optimal
marginal price exceeds marginal cost. This result is in contrast to several models of
horizontal diﬀerentiation, where in equilibrium marginal prices equal marginal costs.
For instance, Armstrong and Vickers (2001) show for spatially diﬀerentiated markets
that the ﬁrms oﬀer cost-based two-part tariﬀs in equilibrium. On the other hand, Yin
(2004) points out that in the context of a Hotelling model, marginal prices are higher
than marginal costs if the transportation costs are shipping costs.21 In the model of
Armstrong and Vickers consumers’ types do not interact with quantity, whereas in
Yin’s model and the one presented here there is an interaction between consumers’
types and quantity. I conclude: regardless of the diﬀerentiation framework, marginal
prices exceed marginal costs if for a given marginal price consumers with diﬀerent
types prefer diﬀerent quantities.









2 − (s1 − p1)
2
− p2(s2 − p2)˜ θ
! = 0 (19)
Inserting the optimal marginal price, p∗












2(1 − ˜ θ




The sign of the derivative of A∗
2 with respect to the market share of ﬁrm 2 is unde-
termined.
21Anderson and Engers (1994) describe two types of transportation costs. A shipping cost
depends on the quantity which is “shipped” and a shopping cost is independent of the amount
purchased.
113.1.2 Proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm 1 (low-quality supplier)
The proﬁt function and the optimization constraints of ﬁrm 1 are given by
π1(p1, ˜ θ) = (˜ θ − ˆ θ) · A1 +
1
2
p1(s1 − p1)(˜ θ
2 − ˆ θ
2) , (21)
where
















2 − (s2 − p2)
2
+ A2 .
Setting the partial derivative of π1 with respect to p1 equal to zero yields an implicit




! = 0 ⇐⇒ 3ˆ θ = ˜ θ . (22)
In equilibrium the low-quality ﬁrm serves 2
3 of the residual demand. Equation (22)
can be rewritten as
p
∗







˜ θ(s2 − p2)2 − A2

.
The optimal marginal price of ﬁrm 1 is higher than marginal costs if the net surplus of
the marginal consumer ˜ θ is suﬃciently small. The net surplus of marginal consumer
˜ θ is quite small if competition between the two ﬁrms is not very intense. Hence,
when the products of the two ﬁrms are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated the marginal price of
ﬁrm 1 is positive. The other ﬁrst-order condition of ﬁrm 1 is obtained by setting the
partial derivative of the proﬁt function with respect to ˜ θ equal to zero. Rewriting
this equation and inserting p∗




































Nash equilibrium of the tariﬀ game: Given that the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximiza-
tion problems have interior solutions, any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the
tariﬀ game is characterized by equations (12), (13), (18), (20), (22), and (23). In a
Nash equilibrium both ﬁrms choose the best response given the rival’s tariﬀ. Hence,
for each ﬁrm the two ﬁrst order conditions must hold.22 Equation (13) ensures that
22The second-order necessary conditions (SOCs) are checked in the appendix, see A.2. I suggest
to postpone reading A.2 until the end of Section 3.
12both ﬁrms choose the same marginal consumer ˜ θ, which is necessary for an equi-
librium. Condition (12) determines the optimal ˆ θ for a given tariﬀ of ﬁrm 1. The
Nash equilibrium of the tariﬀ game cannot be solved analytically. The tariﬀ game
equilibrium is characterized by a polynomial of sixth order in ˜ θ. Fortunately, for the
relevant quality pairs, it can be shown that this polynomial has exactly one root in
[0,1], which is the solution for ˜ θ.
3.2 The quality game
If ﬁrm i chooses the lowest possible quality level, si = 0, it makes non-positive
proﬁts. Consequently, quality levels si = 0 cannot be part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which both ﬁrms enter. In addition, quality levels where the ﬁrms
are not suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, following the entry of both ﬁrms, can be excluded
as candidates for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume that 2s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s1. Then, there is a pure strategy equilib-
rium of the tariﬀ game where both ﬁrms oﬀer linear tariﬀs. In equilibrium, the low
quality ﬁrm has zero market share and consequently earns zero proﬁts.
I assume that the equilibrium with linear tariﬀs is played whenever possible.23 On
the other hand, if 0 < s1 < 1
2s2, then ﬁrm 1 will have a positive market share and
earns positive proﬁts in equilibrium. To see this, consider ﬁrm 2’s incentives not to
serve the whole market,
∂π2
∂˜ θ |˜ θ=0 > 0 provided that

(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2
> 0 . (24)
Put verbally, the high-quality ﬁrm leaves an unsatisﬁed residual demand if condition
(24) is satisﬁed.24 In this case, the low-quality ﬁrm has a positive market share and
consequently positive revenues. Condition (24) always holds for s2 = 1 and s1 ≤ 1
2,
because (s2 − p2) ≥ 1
2s2 > s1 ≥ (s1 − p1). Therefore, in the subgame perfect
equilibrium 1 > ˜ θ∗ > ˆ θ∗ > 0. Hence, both ﬁxed fees are positive and both ﬁrms
realize strictly positive proﬁts. As mentioned above, the tariﬀ game equilibrium is
characterized by a polynomial of sixth order in ˜ θ. For s2 = 1 and s1 = 1
3, this
polynomial has exactly one root for all relevant values of ˜ θ. With the above analysis
and applying numerical methods the next result follows immediately.
Proposition 3 Assume that the entry cost, K, is suﬃciently small. Then there
exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. Both ﬁrms have strictly posi-
tive market shares and make strictly positive proﬁts in equilibrium. The equilibrium







3), the ﬁrms use linear tariﬀs and the
low-quality ﬁrm makes a zero proﬁt.
24If ˜ θ = 0 in equilibrium then ˆ θ also equals zero and consequently A1 = A2 = 0.
13values are:
s1 = 1/3 s2 = 1
π1 = .00138222 π2 = .142833
p1 = .0657433 p2 = .351995
A1 = .00353261 A2 = .0550837
ˆ θ = .0986701 ˜ θ = .29601
4 Two-part tariﬀ competition versus linear pric-
ing
In this section, the results of the game with two-part tariﬀs is compared to the
outcome when price discrimination is banned. An interesting result can be obtained
from the surplus function (2). Suppose that only linear prices are allowed. In this
case, each consumer chooses a ﬁrm to maximize the diﬀerence (si − pi), i = 1,2.
Proposition 4 Suppose there is a ban on price discrimination and that both ﬁrms
have entered the market. Then it is impossible that both ﬁrms realize strictly positive
proﬁts in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the subgame containing the quality game
and the tariﬀ game.
The outcome of the two-stage game (quality game and tariﬀ game) when only linear
pricing is feasible, depends on the behavior of ﬁrm 1. When ﬁrm 1 chooses a quality
s1 < s2 ≤ 1, then in equilibrium ﬁrm 1 has no positive market share and consequently
zero proﬁts. On the other hand, if ﬁrm 1 chooses s1 = s2, there is perfect competition
and π1 = π2 = 0. In either case ﬁrm 1 earns zero proﬁts.
In contrast, if two-part tariﬀs are allowed the two ﬁrms produce distinct qualities
and realize strictly positive proﬁts. Relaxing price competition via quality diﬀeren-
tiation is possible if and only if two-part tariﬀ competition is permitted. With the
above analysis the characterization of ﬁrms’ optimal entry decisions follows imme-
diately. A ﬁrm decides to enter the industry if its expected proﬁts exceed the entry
cost.
Proposition 5 For suﬃciently small entry cost, K,
• two ﬁrms enter the market if price discrimination is permitted.
• a ban on price discrimination leads to a monopoly.
Vertical diﬀerentiation is optimal if and only if price discrimination is feasible. In
contrast, if price discrimination is banned, the products in the market are not dif-
ferentiated. What are the driving forces of this result? An explanation can be given
14by analyzing the utility function corresponding to surplus function (2),





θ ∈ (0,1] .
Note that all consumers have the same tastes for quality, but diﬀer in their prefer-
ences for quantity. The type parameter θ determines a consumer’s satiation point.
Here, ﬁrms’ incentives for quality diﬀerentiation are based on heterogeneity in con-
sumers’ preferences for quantity, which is novel in the literature. Former research
studied vertical diﬀerentiation only with linear tariﬀs, for instance Shaked and Sut-
ton (1982). In these unit-demand frameworks, consumers are heterogeneous with
regard to their tastes for quality.25
Now I address the question how a ban on price discrimination aﬀects welfare,
consumers’ surplus and industry proﬁts. Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of
consumers’ surplus and industry proﬁts. From Proposition 5 the next result follows
immediately.
Proposition 6 Assume that the entry cost, K, is suﬃciently small. Then social
welfare and industry proﬁts are lower and aggregate consumers’ surplus is higher if
two-part tariﬀ competition is banned.
Permitting price discrimination encourages entry, which in turn increases wel-
fare.26 This ﬁnding is in line with the result obtained by Armstrong and Vickers
(2001), who analyze non-linear pricing in a free entry circular city model. In their
model, as in the one presented here, permitting price discrimination increases in-
dustry proﬁts, this encourages entry, which in turn increases welfare. On the other
hand, the above proposition is in contrast to the result of Armstrong and Vickers
(1993). They study the eﬀect of permitting third-degree price discrimination on
entry.27 Armstrong and Vickers show that for reasonable values of the entry cost,
“[...] entry will occur if and only if price discrimination is banned” (Armstrong and
Vickers 1993, p.337). Their result is driven by the fact that competitive third-degree
price discrimination can lower market proﬁts.
It is worthwhile to point out, that imposing a minimum quality-standard can
have the same entry eﬀect as banning price discrimination. If the quality standard
is too high, so that the possible proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 are lower than the entry cost, then
in the subgame perfect equilibrium only one ﬁrm will enter the market.
25 See, for example, Choi and Shin (1992). In Shaked and Sutton (1982), consumers have the
same utility function: u(s,m) = s · m, and diﬀerent incomes (m). Note that the income is like a
taste parameter for quality.
26Market entry in a vertical product diﬀerentiation model is also analyzed by Donnenfeld and
Weber (1992, 1995) and in particular by Johnson and Myatt (2003), however, these are unit-demand
models.
27In Armstrong and Vickers (1993) an incumbent sells its products on two markets. In one of
these markets the incumbent faces a potential entrant.
155 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly with endogenous degree of product
diﬀerentiation and two-part tariﬀs was analyzed. The main ﬁnding is that product
diﬀerentiation occurs in equilibrium if and only if price discrimination is permit-
ted. In the presented model, ﬁrms’ incentives for quality diﬀerentiation are based
on consumers’ heterogeneity in their preferences for quantity. In earlier models of
vertically diﬀerentiated industries, consumers diﬀer in their tastes for quality. Here,
consumers only diﬀer in their preferences for quantity. Nevertheless, ﬁrms choose
distinct qualities in equilibrium if two-part tariﬀs are feasible. The contribution of
this paper to the theory of product diﬀerentiation is that price discrimination can
lead to quality diﬀerentiation.
As shown, the model can also be interpreted as a model of vertical relations with
upstream competition. As far as vertical restraints are concerned this paper shows
that franchise fees can improve upstream competition. This result is in contrast to
several classic contributions where the number of upstream producers is exogenously
given. For instance, Rey and Stiglitz (1988) point out that “vertical restraints may
be used only to decrease competition between producers”. When a government
authority regulates vertical contracts, as done with the Robinson-Patman Act, the
authority should take into account the eﬀect of such regulations on the number of
producers in the market.
In addition, for the vertical diﬀerentiation model that I introduced the eﬀects
of banning price discrimination on entry, welfare, consumers’ surplus, and indus-
try proﬁts were analyzed. It was shown that price discrimination encourages entry,
which in turn increases welfare. Consumers, however, are worse oﬀ when price dis-
crimination is permitted. Moreover, the presented model shows an interesting point
for R&D-models. Consider a model of product innovation with surplus function
v = 1
2θ(s − p)2, where an incumbent faces a potential entrant.28 The entrant can
invest in R&D. When the entrant invests in R&D it enters with a suﬃciently su-
perior product compared to incumbent’s one. If price discrimination is banned and
the entrant innovates, it thereafter serves the whole market. On the other hand,
if two-part tariﬀ competition is permitted both ﬁrms share the market when the
entrant innovates.
For real-world applications, this model represents just an extreme case, similar as
pure spatial competition or logit demand models. In reality, ﬁrms are diﬀerentiated
in more than one characteristic. It is hard to say which diﬀerentiating framework
is more suitable to describe a real market. Markets for wired telephone services
are usually fully covered in developed countries and hence comparable to spatial
competition frameworks. If a telephone service provider changes its tariﬀ, this has
28Product innovation with a Mussa-Rosen type utility function is analyzed for instance by Hoppe
and Lehmann-Grube (2005).
16no eﬀect on the total number of ﬁxed-line network subscribers. On the other hand,
clubs (health, tennis etc.) oﬀer a ﬁxed-quality, for instance a golf club has only one
golf course. Hence, for such markets the vertical diﬀerentiation approach chosen
here seems more suitable. Other product markets are more like the logit-demand
model: when a supplier raises its tariﬀ, some of its former consumers will buy from
a rival, others will not participate in the market anymore.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs to propositions and lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1: When both ﬁrms choose the same quality level, their
products are perfect substitutes. For the proof, I distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Suppose πi > πj ≥ 0 and that the corresponding tariﬀs are (Ti,Tj). Firm





Ti − ε , if Ai > 0
(pi − ε)q , if Ai = 0
,
where ε > 0 is suﬃciently small. The proﬁt of ﬁrm j is then arbitrarily close to
πi > πj.
Case 2:29 Suppose that πi(Ti,Tj) = πj(Tj,Ti) > 0, where Ti is the tariﬀ of
ﬁrm i and Tj the tariﬀ of ﬁrm j. Again, ﬁrm j can increase its proﬁt by slightly
undercutting its rival’s tariﬀ. That is, ﬁrm j uses the tariﬀ T ∗
j deﬁned in Case 1.





























> 0 , (A.1)
where λ is the fraction of customers that purchase from ﬁrm i under tariﬀs (Ti,Tj)
and ˆ θ is the marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying or not when ﬁrm
j would not be present.30 Note that when ﬁrm j slightly undercuts ﬁrm i’s tariﬀ,
29I am grateful to Heidrun C. Hoppe for suggesting the analytical proof for case 2 of Lemma 1.
30If the marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing or not when only ﬁrm i would
be present does not exist, then ˆ θ is equal to zero.
17ﬁrm j obtains all customers of ﬁrm i, λ, and additionally keeps some of its former
customers. Consequently, λ < 1 − ˆ θ.
Hence, when both ﬁrms produce the same quality level, there exists no equilib-
rium where at least one ﬁrm earns strictly positive proﬁts.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 1: Follows immediately from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, it is shown that p1 = A1 = 0 is a best response
for ﬁrm 1 given A2 = 0 and p2 = s2 − s1.
• If p1 > 0 then ﬁrm 1 has no market share for all A1 ≥ 0, since s2 − p2 = s1 >
s1 − p1.
• If A1 > 0 and ﬁrm 1 has a positive market share then it has to hold that
s1 − p1 > s2 − p2 = s1. This condition is violated for all p1 ≥ 0.
Now suppose ﬁrm 1 oﬀers the tariﬀ with p1 = A1 = 0. It is shown that oﬀering
T2 = 0 + (s2 − s1)q is a best response for ﬁrm 2.
If ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt maximization problem has an interior solution then T2 is char-























2(1 − ˜ θ
2) − s
2
1 ≥ 0 . (A.3)
For 2s1 ≥ s2 condition (A.3) is violated and thus the optimal tariﬀ is a corner
solution. That is T2 is either a linear tariﬀ (A2 = 0) or a ﬂat tariﬀ (p2 = 0).
I) Flat tariﬀ (A2 > 0,p2 = 0): By the deﬁnition of the marginal consumer ˜ θ, for




˜ θ(s2 − s1)
2 . (A.4)
Firm 2’s proﬁt is given by















II) Linear tariﬀ (A2 = 0,p2 > 0): In the case of linear tariﬀs it is clear that the
optimal marginal price is p∗
2 = s2 − s1. Then each consumer purchases from ﬁrm
182. If ﬁrm 2 sets a higher price it has no market share, a lower price is not optimal
because p∗
2 = s2 − s1 ≤ 1
2 = pM, where pM is the price of a monopolist with linear





s1(s2 − s1) . (A.6)
A comparison of (A.5) and (A.6) reveals that a linear tariﬀ is optimal for ﬁrm 2.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3: Solving the equations system given by the equations
(12), (13), (18), (20), (22), and (23) yields to the following polynomial in ˜ θ
P(˜ θ) = 27s
4
2(9 − 30˜ θ − 29˜ θ
2 + 108˜ θ
3 + 63˜ θ
4 − 110˜ θ




2(3 − 17˜ θ + 14˜ θ
2 + 46˜ θ
3 − 33˜ θ
4 − 45˜ θ
5)
+ 108(1 − 8˜ θ + 18˜ θ




1(3 − 23˜ θ + 57˜ θ






2(9 − 48˜ θ + 58˜ θ
2 + 40˜ θ






2(27 − 81˜ θ − 18˜ θ
2 + 190˜ θ
3 − 25˜ θ
4 − 125˜ θ
5)
! = 0
A plot of the polynomial for the relevant quality levels (s1 = 1/3 and s2 = 1) is
given below. The plot (Figure 2) shows that the polynomial has exactly one root
for ˜ θ ∈ [0,1].
Figure 2: Solution of the equilibrium marginal consumer
Using numerical methods for solving the equations system yields to the equilibrium
values for marginal prices, ﬁxed fees, and proﬁts.
q.e.d.
19Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose s1 ≤ s2 ≤ 1, then consumer θ’s net utility is:
1







0 θ dθ , if s1 − p1 > s2 − p2
1
2 · p1(s1 − p1)
R 1
0 θ dθ , if s1 − p1 = s2 − p2 and s1 = s2
0 , otherwise
. (A.7)
Consequently, ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to choose p1 ≥ 0 as high as possible such that
s1 − p1 > s2 − p2 and it can serve the whole market. Clearly ﬁrm 1 will not set p1
higher than the monopoly price, that is p1 ≤ 1
2s1. Note that the problem for ﬁrm 2
is similar. Thus for the price game equilibrium one obtains:
if s1 = s2 =⇒ p
∗
1 = 0, p
∗
2 = 0 and π
∗
1 = 0, π
∗
2 = 0
if s1 < s2 =⇒ p
∗
1 = 0, p
∗
2 = s2 − p2 and π
∗
1 = 0, π
∗
2 > 0 ,
If ﬁrm 1 is aware that s2 = 1, then the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is always zero, independent
of the quality level s1. Hence, all quality-levels s1 ∈ {0, 1
3, 2
3,1} are possible in a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 5: Follows directly from Proposition 3 in combination
with Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6: If price discrimination is permitted, the equilibrium
tariﬀs, proﬁts, and quality-levels are given in Proposition 3. The social welfare is
then:
WD := π1 +π2 +
Z 1
˜ θ
v2(p2,θ) dθ−(1− ˜ θ)A2 +
Z ˜ θ
ˆ θ
v1(p1,θ) dθ−(˜ θ− ˆ θ)A1 . (A.8)
Substituting the equilibrium values into (A.8), one obtains
W
∗
D = 0.201913 . (A.9)








2 = 0.144215 (A.10)
CS
∗
D = 0.0576981 . (A.11)
On the other hand, if price discrimination is banned, only one ﬁrm (M) enters





θ(1 − pM) dθ → max
pM
. (A.12)
20The optimal price is p∗
M = 1
2 and the corresponding equilibrium values for proﬁt,
welfare and consumers’ surplus are:
π
∗
M = 0.125 (A.13)
W
∗
M = 0.1875 (A.14)
CS
∗
M = 0.0625 . (A.15)
q.e.d.
A.2 Examination of second-order conditions
First I check the second-order condition (SOC) for ﬁrm 2 (high-quality). The partial






s2(1 − ˜ θ)
2 − (1 − ˜ θ)p2 . (A.16)





= −(1 − ˜ θ) < 0 (A.17)
∂2π2
∂˜ θ∂p2
= p2 − s2(1 − ˜ θ) (A.18)
Taking the second-order partial derivative of π2 with respect to ˜ θ yields
∂2π2
∂˜ θ2 = −

(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2
− p2(s2 − p2) < 0 . (A.19)
Since the zero points of the FOCs are unique, the FOCs describe a global maximum
point if the proﬁt function is concave in the neighborhood of the stationary point.
Consequently, it is suﬃcient to check the sign of the determinant of the Hessian












⇒ det(H) = (1 − ˜ θ)

(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)






2 − 2p2s2(1 − ˜ θ) + s
2




Since a corner solution (p2 = 0 or p2 = s2) cannot be optimal, the optimal marginal
price is characterized by the FOC. Inserting the optimal marginal price p∗
2 = 1
2(1 −
˜ θ)s2 into (A.20) yields
21det(H) =
(1 − ˜ θ)

(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2
| {z }















> 0 . (A.21)
q.e.d.
Next, I check the SOC for the low-quality ﬁrm. To prove that the SOC holds for
the low quality ﬁrm using the determinant of the Hessian matrix is very tedious. It
is easier to show that the proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm 1 is not solved by a
corner solution. Suppose ﬁrm 1 sets the marginal price as high as possible, that is,
p1 = s1. Then consumers obtain a non positive surplus if they purchase from ﬁrm
1 and consequently π1 = 0. Similarly, if ﬁrm 1 sets ˜ θ = 0 then it has no market
share and thus zero proﬁts. On the other hand, if ˜ θ = 1 the high-quality ﬁrm has no
market share and realizes zero proﬁts. This cannot happen in equilibrium: if only
one ﬁrm is active in the market it is clearly the high-quality ﬁrm. To summarize,
all corner solutions can be ruled out except that ﬁrm 1 sets p1 = 0 and oﬀers a ﬂat
tariﬀ.




1 (˜ θ) :=

˜ θ − ˆ θ(˜ θ)

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Taking the derivative of π
flat































1 − (s2 − p2)
2 ! = 0 . (A.22)
Solving the above equation for ˜ θ yields
˜ θ =
2(s2 − p2)2 − s2
1
(s2 − p2)2 [(s2 − p2)2 − s2
1]
A2 (A.23)
Evaluating the proﬁt function, π
flat
1 , at the equilibrium tariﬀ of ﬁrm 2 and for s1 = 1
3
and s2 = 1 yields
π
flat
1 = 0.00129999 < 0.0138222 = π
∗
1 .
Hence a ﬂat tariﬀ is not optimal for ﬁrm 1. All potential corner solutions have been
ruled out as proﬁt maximizing solutions, thus the proﬁt maximization problem of
ﬁrm 1 has an interior solution.
q.e.d.
22A.3 Proof of the claim in Footnote 18
Note that for the complete analysis of the tariﬀ game it was not used that s2 > s1.
It was used that ﬁrm 2 serves the consumers with high valuation and that ﬁrm 1
serves the consumers with low valuations. Now suppose that s2 < s1 and that ﬁrm
2 still serves the consumers with high valuations while ﬁrm 1 serves the consumers
with low valuations. The assumed market structure implies that
s1 − p1 < s2 − p2 (A.24)
and A2 > A1 ≥ 0. The marginal price of the ﬁrm that serves the market segment





p2=0 > 0. The optimal mar-







(1 − ˜ θ)s2 . (A.25)
Substituting (A.25) into (A.24) yields to the following condition
1
2
(1 + ˜ θ)s2 > s1 − p1 . (A.26)
Clearly it should hold that 2s2 < s1, otherwise there is an equilibrium with linear
pricing and the high-quality ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1) serves the whole market. The unique
quality pair that satisﬁes the above condition and where both ﬁrms share the market






(1 + ˜ θ)s2 > s1 − p1 = 1 − p1 . (A.27)
Note that p1 ≤ pM = 1
2, where pM is the price of a monopolist who is restricted
to use linear pricing.31 Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium with the low-quality
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